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The predictions people make when
placed in a two-choice uncertain
outcome situation have received con-
siderable attention in recent years.
In the classical situation, as first
used by Humphreys (1939), S is asked
to predict which of two events (e.g.,
illumination or nonillumination of a
light) will occur after a signal stimu-
lus. The two events occur with
fixed but unequal probabilities, say
TI and 7T2, in a random sequence for a
number of trials, and the occurrence
of either is not contingent on S's be-
havior. The S is instructed to do his
best to predict which will occur.
He is allowed to witness the event,
and thus to determine for himself
the correctness or incorrectness of his
prediction.
There are two theoretical models of
interest here which yield predictions
about S's behavior in a situation of
this sort.
One is Estes' (1950, 1954; Estes &
Burke, 1953) statistical learning model
which yields the prediction that Ss
will learn to match their response
ratios (the relative frequencies with
which they predict each of the events)
to the actual probabilities of occur-
rence of the events. The same pre-
diction is yielded by the Bush-Mos-
teller (1955) model when certain
restrictions are applied to the param-
eters of that model. A number of
studies report findings in support of
this prediction (Estes & Straughan,
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The second model, formalized by
Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947), is a game-theoretic model.
According to some interpreters, one
prediction consistent with this model
is that a person will learn to maximize
the expected frequency of correct pre-
dictions. This is accomplished by his
predicting the more frequent event
on all trials. Evidence giving some
support to this prediction may be
found elsewhere (Galanter & Gersten-
haber, 1956; Goodnow, 1955; Toda,
1956).
From decision-making theory
(Davidson, Suppes, & Siegel, 1957;
Edwards, 1954), an hypothesis of
maximization of expected utility may
be drawn which will account for both
sorts of prediction behaviors (match-
ing response ratios and maximizing
the expected frequency of correct pre-
dictions). The "utility" of an out-
come is its subjective value. Accord-
ing to the decision-making approach,
S's choice behavior (here, his pre-
dictions) depends on certain condi-
tions related to the reinforcement
inherent in the situation. The gen-
eral hypothesis is that a person will
maximize expected utility in any case.
It must be pointed out, however, that
the components of the total utility
vary in magnitude from one reinforce-
ment situation to another, and thus
the strategy to maximize expected
utility varies.
It is reasonable to suppose that
when S is in a situation in which the
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only payoff attached to the outcomes
is the satisfaction of having his pre-
diction confirmed by the event or the
dissatisfaction of having his predic-
tion dis-confirmed by it, making a
correct prediction of the rarer event
has greater utility for S than making
a correct prediction of the more fre-
quent event. The S may be sup-
posed to derive satisfaction from
"playing a game with the machine,"
trying to "outwit" it. Moreover, it
may be monotonous to make the same
prediction on trial after trial over a
long series, and predicting the rarer
event may therefore satisfy S's utility
of relieving boredom. If it is true
that among the components of S's
total utility in this "no-payoff" situa-
tion are the utility of correctly pre-
dicting the more frequent event, the
(possibly greater) utility of correctly
predicting the rarer event, and the
utility of relieving boredom, then S
may maximize his total satisfaction
in this situation by choosing a "mixed
strategy," and this may approximate
matching his response ratio to the
actual probabilities of occurrence of
the two events. If such an account
is correct, then a decision-making
model and the Estes model could
yield the same predictions concerning
behavior in a two-choice no-payoff
situation.
If, however, the utility attached to
correct predictions is increased by a
change in the conditions of the game
(i.e., if there is potential satisfaction
beyond that of having an event con-
firm one's prediction), or if the cost
attached to an incorrect prediction
is increased, then the prediction
yielded by the hypothesis of maximi-
zation of expected utility diverges
from the prediction yielded by the
Estes model. That is, if the decision-
making approach proposed here is
correct, the introduction of systematic
variation in the utilities attached to
correct or incorrect predictions should
be followed by systematic differences
in S's responses. As the utility of a
correct prediction is increased or the
negative utility of an incorrect pre-
diction is increased, S's prediction
of the more frequent event should
tend to 100%—i.e., he should tend to
choose a "pure strategy" rather than
a mixed one.
In the experiment designed to test
this contention, three different experi-
mental conditions (levels of reinforce-
ment) were selected to effect system-
atic variation in the utility attached to
correct and incorrect predictions.
Under the "no-payoff" condition, the
correctness or incorrectness of S's
predictions did not affect his monetary
holding. Under the "reward" condi-
tion, the utility attached to a correct
prediction was greater, for there was
a monetary payoff for each correct
prediction. Under the "risk" condi-
tion, the utility attached to a correct
prediction was still greater, for there
was a monetary loss for each incorrect
prediction as well as a monetary gain
for each correct prediction, and thus
a correct prediction rather than an
incorrect prediction had twice as great
an effect on S's monetary holding
under the "risk" condition as under
the "reward" condition.
The purpose of the procedure to be
described was to provide data to
test the hypothesis that the asymptotic
probability of SV predicting the occur-
rence of the more frequent event in a
two-choice uncertain outcome situation
is a function of the level of reinforcement
present in the situation, such that the
probability of predicting the more fre-
quent event will tend toward unity as the
rewards (positive utility) and costs
(negative utility] of correct and incorrect
predictions are increased.
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Estes, 1950), where pi(°°) is the mean
asymptotic probability of predicting
EI for a group of like Ss, the hypothe-
sis is that pi(°°) under risk > pi(<*>)
under reward > pi(°°) under no
payoff.
METHOD
Subjects.—The Ss were 36 male undergraduate
students at Pennsylvania State University.
Apparatus.—Each S was run individually.
For the experimental session, S was seated
before a board to which three electric light bulbs
were attached. Two, the "event" bulbs, were
60-w. bulbs set 8 in. apart. Directly between
these and 6 in. below was a red 7 j-w. bulb which
served as the signal stimulus (warning light).
On the table in front of S, between him and the
board, were two push buttons set 4 in. apart.
The E was seated behind the board. Unseen
by S, his push buttons were connected to bulbs
at JJ's desk. Depending on which button S
pressed, one of the two bulbs at -E's desk would
light, enabling E to record S's predictions for the
trial. As will be discussed, the sequence of
"event" lights (right or left) for the successive
trials was determined in advance of a session,
and E followed this sequence in throwing a
switch from his desk causing one or the other
"event" bulb to light. None of E's switching
or recording equipment was visible to S.
For each trial, the signal stimulus (red bulb)
would light and remain on for 3 sec. During
this time, S made his prediction by pressing one
of the buttons on the table before him. When
the red bulb went off, one of the "event" bulbs
would light and would remain on for 2 sec. A
2-sec. period intervened between trials.
Procedure.—The 36 Ss were randomly
assigned to three groups of equal size, the group
assignment determining the condition under
which each S would be run. The three condi-
tions were No Payoff, Reward, and Risk.
Under the No Payoff condition, the rein-
forcement for each prediction consisted simply
in seeing the outcome, i.e., seeing whether the
right or left bulb lighted, and thereby determin-
ing whether one's prediction was confirmed or
dis-confirmed. The No Payoff condition has
been the "classical" situation for studies of
human behavior in two-choice situations.
Under the Reward condition, the reinforce-
ment for each prediction consisted in seeing the
outcome and receiving 5 cents for each correct
prediction. The S-cent reward was given at the
conclusion of each trial in which S's prediction
was confirmed.
Under the Risk condition, the reinforcement
for each prediction consisted in seeing the out-
come, receiving 5 cents if the prediction was con-
firmed, and losing S cents if it was dis-confirmed.
At the conclusion of every trial, S either received
or forfeited S cents, depending on whether his
prediction had been correct or incorrect.
Two series of event sequences were prepared.
One contained 75 lefts and 25 rights; the other
was identical except that the lefts and rights
were reversed, so that it contained 25 lefts and
75 rights. To counterbalance for the effects
of possible right-left preference, half of the Ss
under each condition were presented with each
series.
In the 100-trial series, the order of occurrence
of the two events was randomized, by use of a
table of random numbers, with two modifica-
tions: adjustments were made so that (a) there
was no run of more than six successive occur-
rences of the more frequent event, and (b)
within every 20-trial block the 3:1 proportion
was maintained.
Each S was seen at an individual testing
session in which a 100-trial series was presented.
Each such session required about 30-min.
At the start of the session, standard instruc-
tions were given to all Ss: "Your task in this
experiment is to try to predict correctly which
light will come on following the onset of the
signal light. Three seconds after the signal
light comes on, either the left or the right light
will come on. As it is very important that you
make a choice for each trial, please make your
prediction as soon as possible after the signal
light comes on. In any case, you must make
your prediction in less than 3 sec.
"On the platform before you there are two
buttons. If your prediction is that the left
light will come on, press the left button. If
your prediction is that the right light will come
on, press the right button.
"Do you have any questions as to what you
are to do? Let's run through what could hap-
pen. I will give you an example of each event."
In addition to these standard instructions and
examples given to all Ss, some additional special
instructions were given depending on the
condition under which the S was being run. The
No Payoff Ss were told simply: "Now, do your
best to predict correctly which light will come
on for every trial." The Reward Ss received
these additional instructions: "Now, every
time you predict correctly you will win 5 cents;
every time you predict incorrectly you will not
win anything. At the end of the session all
the money you have won will be yours to keep.
That is, for every time you predict correctly
you will win 5 cents, and all the money in your
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to you. Now, if you make no correct predic-
tions you will have won no money by the end of
the game, but if you play carefully you should
come out winning at the end of the session."
The additional instructions given to the Risk
Ss were these: "Now, every time you predict
correctly you will win 5 cents; every time you
predict incorrectly you will lose 5 cents. We
will start you off with 75 cents, and you will
keep all of your winnings at the end of the
session. That is, at the end of the session all
the money in your possession will belong to you.
Now, if you do not play carefully, you are
likely to lose your starting stake and therefore
end the session with no money. However,
if you play carefully you could end the session
with a considerable amount of money which
would be yours to keep."
The instructions to both the Reward and the
Risk Ss concluded with this statement:
"Let me make it quite clear: all the money
you win you can keep. There are no strings
attached, and please understand you will be
paid the exact amount you win. This money
does not belong to me; it comes from a research
grant, so I am not concerned with how much or
how little you win. The amount you win will
depend entirely on how you play. Is that clear?
All right. Now do your best to predict cor-
rectly which light will come on for every trial."
Every S under every condition was given 75
cents at the start of each session.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For the test of the hypothesis, Ss'
final 20 predictions in the course of
each 100-trial series were observed.
The score for any S was the propor-
tion of times he predicted (whether
correctly or not) the occurrence of the
more frequent event during those
final 20 trials.
Table 1 shows the distribution of
these scores for all Ss for the final
20 trials of the 100-trial series. Inas-
much as the research hypothesis was
an ordered alternative hypothesis,
these data were tested by the
Jonckheere (1954) test, a nonparamet-
ric ^-sample test against ordered
alternatives. By this test, it is possi-
ble to reject the null hypothesis of no
differences in favor of the alternative
hypothesis at the p < .00003 level.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF Ss PREDICTING MORE FREQUENT
EVENT AT VARIOUS PROPORTIONS DURING



































That is, the data confirm the predic-
tion that Ss under the Risk condition
will predict the more frequent light
oftener than Ss under the Reward
condition, and these in turn will pre-
dict the more frequent light oftener
than Ss under the No Payoff condi-
tion. An interesting feature of the
distributions shown in Table 1 is that
there is no overlap between the scores
of the Risk and No Payoff Ss.
The mean proportion of times that
the more frequent light was predicted
during the final trials of the first
100-trial series under the No Payoff
condition was .70. Under Reward,
the mean was .77. Under Risk, it
was .93.
Four Ss were selected at random
from the 12 under each condition
and were run under the same condi-
tion for an additional 200 trials at a
second session a week later. Al-
though the number of cases is small,
it is of interest to observe that these
Ss' scores, during the final 20 trials
of the second and third 100-trial series
separately, each confirm the hypoth-
esis, by the Jonckheere test, at well
beyond the .01 level. For descriptive
purposes, the mean proportions forDECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR 41
these subgroups are presented in
Table 2. The body of Table 2 gives
the average proportion of trials on
which the more frequent light was
predicted by these Ss in the various
series under the various conditions.
It is of some interest to observe that
under both the No Payoff and the
Reward conditions, these proportions
increase from series to series (reach-
ing -iri = .75 for the No Payoff condi-
tion at the end of the third series),
whereas under the Risk condition
Ss exhibited stable behavior, on the
average, throughout the three series.
It would seem that Ss learn most
rapidly under a condition of Risk
(increased reinforcement).
The utility hinging on correct or
incorrect predictions differed under the
No Payoff, Reward, and Risk conditions,
and thus the attempt to maximize ex-
pected utility led to different strategies
under these conditions. Thus any at-
tempt to construct a unified theory to
account for the choice behavior to which
both the Estes model and the game
theoretic model have reference would
have to consider, in addition to the
utility of a correct prediction, other
components of the total utility such as
the specific utility of gambling, the
negative utility of "boredom" (i.e.,
the result of always pressing the same
button in predicting the same event
over hundreds of trials), etc. If these
components of the total utility are
TABLE 2
MEAN PROPORTION OF TIMES THE MORE
FREQUENT EVENT WAS PREDICTED BY A SUB-
GROUP OF FOUR Ss, RANDOMLY SELECTED
FROM EACH PAYOFF GROUP, DURING


















conceived as varying in magnitude
under the experimental conditions, then
the data which have been reported
support the general hypothesis that Ss'
choice behavior reflects an attempt to
maximize expected utility.
Some investigators in this field, espe-
cially those influenced by game theoretic
principles, have asserted that people
who match their response ratios to the
probabilities are acting "irrationally,"
because such people could increase their
expected proportion of correct predic-
tions by predicting the more frequent
event on every trial. However, as
Simon (1956, p. 271) has reminded us,
one must bear in mind the distinction
between subjective rationality (i.e., be-
havior that is rational, given the percep-
tual and evaluational premises of S) and
objective rationality (rationality as viewed
by E). The empirical fact that Ss'
proportions of choices of the more fre-
quent event increase as reinforcement
and risk are increased seems to show
that, in their choice behavior, Ss act as
though they were attempting to maxi-
mize expected utility. If this is the
case we can designate the mixed strategy
behavior, in the No Payoff condition,
as rational in that it will lead to the
greatest expected payoff in total satis-
faction.
SUMMARY
The purpose of the experiment which has
been reported was to test the hypothesis that
the asymptotic probability of S's predicting the
occurrence of the more frequent event in a two-
choice uncertain outcome situation is a function
of the level of reinforcement present in the
situation, such that the probability of predicting
the more frequent event will tend toward unity
as the rewards (positive utility) and costs
(negative utility) of correct and incorrect
predictions are increased. This hypothesis is
drawn from the theory of decision making.
The Ss' predictions were observed in a two-
choice uncertain outcome situation under three
conditions: No Payoff, Reward, and Risk.
The proportion of times Ss predicted the more
frequent outcome differed under these three
conditions in the predicted direction,42 SIDNEY SEIGEL AND DONALD A. GOLDSTEIN
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